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THE MARSHALL COURT AND THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
CHARLES F. HOBSON*

Professor Johnson provides a fresh perspective that promises
to deepen our understanding of the traditional view that Chief
Justice John Marshall enhanced the power of the Supreme Court
while facilitating the growth of federal power in relation to that of
the states. Perhaps unconventionally for a historian, he seeks to
illuminate the workings of a past institution by looking at those of
a modern institution, the European Court of Justice. Scholars
should be instinctively cautious about adopting a comparative
approach. With their fondness for the unique and particular,
historians should be especially so, particularly when the two
institutions are so widely separated in space and time. As a sound
historian, Johnson is sensitive to the potential pitfalls of
comparative history.
He shows appropriate caution by not
overdrawing comparisons between the Marshall Court and the
European Court and by not reading too much significance into the
parallels between the two. Johnson is not the first scholar to
compare the American and European courts, as he points out.
Previous studies, while mentioning the Marshall Court in passing,
have principally focused on the European Court and the modern
Supreme Court as the points of comparison and have taken a
social science approach that examines the workings of a central
court in a modern federal system. Johnson's focus, he explains, "is
not upon the European Court of Justice, but rather upon the
Marshall Court, and what the experience of the European Court
tells us about the Marshall era."'
Notwithstanding a vast temporal separation, a comparison of
the Marshall and European Courts seems especially apposite
given their institutional settings at the beginning stages of
developing federal systems. American federalism and European
unity began in the wake of wars that disrupted prewar economies
that were similarly dependent on international commerce. Both
the newly independent American states and the post-war
European states faced similar challenges posed by the collapse of
* Editor-in Chief, The Papers of John Marshall.
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their commercial and economic systems and by their vulnerability
to rival superpowers.
Both experienced the same incentives
toward eliminating internal trade barriers and had much to gain
by pooling resources into a closer economic union. One apparently
striking difference is that the European Union is based on a series
of international treaties that, along with multilingual Community
legislation and judicial decisions, constitute the law of the
European Community.
The United States Constitution, by
contrast, is a single document with one official language that has
been subject to fewer amendments over a much longer period.
Somewhat mitigating this difference, however, is that the
European
treaties have
become
"constitutionalized" as
foundational documents that operate something like our
Constitution. Moreover, the "open-textured" provisions, the vague
and undefined terms that are found in the European treaties and
call forth judicial interpretation, have their counterparts in the
United States Constitution.
Johnson's ensuing analysis turns up some interesting
commonalities between the two courts, for example, their similar
approaches to interpretation, their willingness to leave
constitutional questions "open-ended," their reliance on the
principle of supremacy to facilitate centralized control of the
economy, and their determination to protect and extend their
jurisdictional turf. Johnson's larger aim is not simply to point out
similarities but, as he says, to gain new insights into the history of
the Marshall Court. The net result of this comparative exercise, I
believe, is to reinforce the orthodox view that the Marshall Court
was a nationalizing and centralizing institution, that it promoted
the growth of federal powers and restricted state powers while
shrewdly exploiting its jurisdiction to build up its own
institutional strength. In one sense, Johnson does question
orthodoxy by de-emphasizing the role of Marshall, stripping away
at the heroic image created by Beveridge and other biographers.
He shifts attention away from the strong and forceful personality
of the great Chief himself to institutional dynamics as a way of
explaining the achievements of the Marshall Court. Central
courts in federal unions, particularly those operating at the outset
of their establishment, appear to "enjoy unique advantages in
shaping the constitutional and legal foundations of those emerging
central governments[.]"' Thus Marshall happened to be in the
right place at the right time; in a real sense, greatness was thrust
upon him. This calls to mind Holmes's famous comment delivered
during the centennial of Marshall's appointment in 1901: "A great
man represents a great ganglion in the nerves of society, or, to
vary the figure, a strategic point in the campaign of history, and

2. Id.
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part of his greatness consists in his being there."3 Without
gainsaying Marshall's greatness, Holmes asked us to "remember
also that there fell to Marshall perhaps the greatest place that
ever was filled by a judge[.]"4
Johnson devotes the longest section of his paper to a
discussion of judicial interpretation.
Borrowing the terms
"contextual" and "teleological" or "purposive" that describe the
prevailing modes of judicial interpretation on the European Court,
Johnson appears to argue that Marshall Court decisions relied on
a purposive interpretative strategy to a greater degree than has
previously been recognized. He also seems to employ these terms
somewhat in opposition to each other, the one being text-based,
the other being non-text-based. But the commentators on the
European Court on whom Johnson relies do not sharply
distinguish between these modes of interpretation and treat them
together as largely supplanting two other methods, the literal and
historical. The literal, which looks to the natural and ordinary
meaning of words, is of limited utility for the European Court
because of the multilingual nature of Community law and because
of the generality of the language of the Treaties, the "opentextured" nature of many of its provisions and in Community
legislation.5 The latter reason might seem to apply with equal
force to the United States Constitution as well, but the Marshall
Court appears to have relied on literal construction to a much
greater extent than does the European Court and used it to great
effect, not only in ordinary statutory construction but in
expounding the Constitution as well. Indeed, perhaps the most
striking aspect of Marshall's approach to constitutional
interpretation was the degree to which he was able to assimilate it
to the methods and techniques of statutory construction.
The European Court also largely eschews reliance on
historical materials as a guide to intention. The same was true of
the Marshall Court, which refused to allow what it called
"extrinsic" evidence to influence its interpretation of the Contract
Clause -for example, the absence of complaints about bankruptcy
laws at the time the Constitution was ratified.6 Marshall did
occasionally appeal to the "history of the times" and cited The
Federalist,but always in a way that was illustrative rather than
dispositive of the question of meaning.
According to the commentators on the European Court, the
3.

Oliver Wendell Holmes, John Marshall, in Collected Legal Papers 267-

68 (1920).
4. Id. at 267-68, 270.
5. L. NEVILLE BROWN & TOM KENNEDY, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 302-22 (4th ed. 1994); STEPHEN WEATHERILL &

PAUL BEAUMONT, EC LAW 143-49 (1993).
6. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202 (1819).
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contextual and teleological approaches have had to be increasingly
employed because resort to plain meaning does not provide a
satisfactory resolution of the issue. These two approaches are
typically used in the same opinion and indeed blend almost
imperceptibly into one another. This merging of the two methods
is reflected in this passage from an opinion by that court: "Every
provision of Community law must be placed in its context and
interpreted in the light of the provisions of Community law as a
whole[.]" 7 A passage from another opinion, which Johnson quotes
as an example of contextual reasoning, reflects the same
intermingling of interpretative methods: "To determine in a
particular case the Community's authority to enter into
international agreements, one must have regard to the whole
scheme of the Treaty no less than to its specific provisions."" It
would probably not be too difficult to find an equivalent expression
in a Marshall Court opinion. For example, in United States v.
Fisher, Marshall says, "It is undoubtedly a well established
principle in the exposition of statutes, that every part is to be
considered, and the intention of the legislature to be extracted
from the whole."9 In any event, the Marshall Court resorted to
contextual and purposive reasoning, though perhaps these terms
have not heretofore been applied to its interpretative methods.
The Chief Justice well understood that the meaning of a particular
clause or phrase was not always self-evident, that it could not be
divorced from its context and had to be interpreted by reference to
the subject, nature, and purpose of the law or Constitution.
Marshall's preferred rule of construction was "to adhere to the
letter of the statute, taking the whole together." A law, he said,
"was the best expositor of itself," every part of which was "to be
taken into view, for the purposes of discovering the mind of the
legislature." °
In constitutional exposition no less than in
statutory construction, Marshall was adroit in using a written
instrument as its own dictionary. He eschewed clause-bound
textualism in favor of a broader technique that attempted to read
the contested word or phrase by comparing or contrasting it to
identical or similar words or phrases elsewhere in the
Constitution.
Akhil Reed Amar calls this technique
"intratextualism," citing as a classic example Marshall's analysis
of the word "necessary" in McCulloch. Amar enthusiastically
endorses "intratextualism" as a valuable legacy from the Marshall
7.

WEATHERILL

& BEAUMONT, supra note 5, at 148 (quoting Case c-213/89,

CILFIT v. Italian Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415, 3430 (1990)).
8. Johnson, supra note 1 at 1078 (quoting Case 22/70, Re The European
Road Transport Agreement: E.C. Commission v. E.C. Council, [19711 C.M.L.R.

335, 336-39 (1971)).
9. 6

U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805).

10. Pennington v. Coxe, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 33, 52 (1804).
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Court, one that can be usefully employed by the modern-day
constitutional interpreter.
Intratextualism, says Amar, also
involves using the Constitution as a concordance, in which the
interpreter places similar but non-contiguous clauses together in
an effort to discern a deep thematic connection or larger harmony.
An example is Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, where Justice Story
invoked the phrase "the people" in the Preamble and in the Tenth
Amendment -that is, at the beginning and at the end of the
Constitution- in a way that suggests a deep underlying
constitutional principle of popular sovereignty." This variety of
intratextualism appears to approximate the teleological or
purposive construction favored by the European Court.
It may be helpful to see the literal, contextual, and purposive
as forming a continuum within the broader category of textualism.
The literal focuses on the particular clause or phrase in question,
the contextual on the context (that is, the placement of the clause
or phrase within the Constitution or Treaties), and the purposive
on the grand design or scheme of the Treaties or Constitution that
is spelled out in the preamble and in various articles. All of these
modes of interpretation are more or less anchored to the text.
Marshall made use of all three (and perhaps a historical argument
as well) in McCulloch v. Maryland. The difference between the
European Court and the Marshall Court on the matter of
interpretation seems to be one of emphasis and degree. Both
employ "textualist" or "intratextualist" approaches, though with
the European Court the contextual and purposive usually assumes
primacy over the literal. With the Marshall Court it is the other
way around. This difference is neatly illustrated by two passages
from opinions given by these respective courts. In the first, the
European Court observes: "To ascertain whether the provisions of
an international treaty extend so far in their effects it is necessary
to consider the spirit, the general scheme, and the wording of
those provisions." 2 Contrast this with Marshall, who in Brown v.
Maryland (1827) said:
In performing the delicate and important duty of construing clauses
in the constitution of our country, which involve conflicting powers
of the government of the Union, and of the respective States, it is
proper to take a view of the literal meaning of the words to be
expounded, of their connexion with other words, and of the general
objects to be accomplished by the prohibitory clause, or by the grant
of power.i
11. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REv. 747, 758-63, 792-

93 (1999).
12. BROwN & KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 304 (quoting Case 26/62, Van
Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse administratie der belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1 at

12, [1963] C.M.L.R. 105 (1963)).
13. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 437 (1827).
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Despite this difference of emphasis, the interpretative
objective is the same: to determine whether the contested word or
phrase is to be understood in a more restrictive or more enlarged
sense than the common understanding. What seems beyond doubt
is that the Marshall Court used close textual analysis and the
European Court has used contextual and teleological construction
to the same effect: to support an expansive reading of federal
powers and of the restrictions on state powers

